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ABSTRACT 
Organisations develop their computer security procedures based on external guidelines such as 
ISO 17799 with very little provision to incorporate organisational knowledge in their security 
procedures.  While these external guidelines make recommendations as to how an organisation 
should develop and implement best practices in computer security they often fail to provide a 
mechanism that links the security process to the organisational knowledge. The result is that 
often, security policies, procedures and controls are implemented that are neither strong nor 
consistent with the organisation’s objectives. This study has examined the role of Knowledge 
Management in organisational Computer Security in 19 Australian SMEs. The study has 
determined that although the role of knowledge management in organisational computer security 
is currently limited, there appears to be evidence to argue that the application of knowledge 
management systems to organisational computer security development and management 
processes will considerably enhance performance and reduce costs. 
The study supports that future research is warranted to focus on how existing computer security 
standards and practices can be improved to allow for a stronger integration with organisational 
knowledge through the application of knowledge management systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade organisations have become significantly more reliant on computer supported 
information and communication systems.  Higgins (1999) asserts that the role of computer 
security has a significant effect on organisational performance. Power (2002) claimed that 
computer security breaches in 2002 cost organisations in excess of US$100 billion in either lost 
revenue or direct costs. Studies indicate that eight out of ten organisations suffered financial loss 
as a result of their security breaches (Power, 2002).  Higgins (1999) and Kee (2002) mention that 
due to technical advancement, the security breaches are becoming sophisticated, resulting in 
increased computer security procedures.   A key factor identified by Brooks et al. (2002) as a 
reason why many organisations did not have effective computer security measures was that 
organisations often attempt to achieve a balance between cost and compliance. Organisations 
often find it difficult to justify the cost of a computer security expert and as a result Higgins 
(1999) argues that many organisations place a greater reliance on external standards and expertise 
when managing their computer security.  
Brooks et al. (2002) state that the majority of organisations develop their computer security 
primarily based on external industry standards such as the Standard for Information Security 
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Management1.  While the implementation of AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799 may require an 
organisation’s internal knowledge and their security infrastructure, according to Kee (2002) and 
Brooks et al. (2002), an organisation’s computer security may become weak if proper integration 
of security policies and the knowledge found in organisations fail to exist.  Kee (2002) further 
argues that the lack of continuity between security policies and organisational knowledge has a 
negative effect on the quality of their computer security.  Von Solms (1999) has similar 
sentiments while establishing a direct positive relationship between an organisation’s explicit 
knowledge and the quality of the development of computer security recommendations, policies 
and mechanisms.  
Although prior studies indicate that the application of knowledge management to computer 
security has the ability to realise considerable benefits to organisations in developing and 
managing their security, there is a lack of understanding of the various factors influencing their 
relationship ( Goh, 2002; Higgins, 1999; Kee, 2002; Kwok & Longley, 1999; Von Solms, 1999).  
Therefore it can be argued that the ability of an organisation to improve their computer security 
by a more effective integration of organisation’s knowledge might yield better understanding of 
procedures needed to develop, implement and maintain computer security policies to combat 
security breaches. This has provided the impetus to this study.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The code of practice for information security management AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799 2 is an 
international codified standard applicable to Australia and New Zealand and is used by many 
organisations as a guide to develop best practices to develop information and computer security.  
While the standard has been validated through a process of industry review and approval, it 
appears that the standard is weak because it places a strong reliance on external computer security 
expertise rather than internal knowledge that can facilitate the same functions (Kee, 2002; Von 
Solms, 1999).  Bhatt (2002) claims that organisations are currently facing extreme challenges 
because of the ill-defined flow of an individual’s knowledge within an organisational context and 
hence has very little contribution to the development of the organisational objectives. Therefore, 
it can be argued that for effective management of security policies, organisations should consider 
their internal sources as well. Therefore, one would expect that, if organisations could streamline 
the knowledge flow, integrate existing knowledge in computer security procedures, then some of 
these security breaches could have been minimised.  
Prior knowledge in the context of organisational procedures and controls is considered by Von 
Solms (1999) to support computer security.  In order to realise an organisation’s computer 
security related information flow, there should be an integrated approach to inter-organisational 
reporting systems. This can happen only when the knowledge in an organisation is properly 
understood and captured.  Von Solms (1999) argues that such a process will support the 
organisation in integrating security compliance and decision making with their controls.  Von 
Solms (1999) draws relationships between the computer security processes, policies and 
mechanisms and the organisational environment to establish a direct relationship between 
organisational knowledge and development of computer security related recommendations, 
policies and mechanisms.  Smith (2001) states that organisations must recognise the value of 
                                                 
1 The Standard for Information Security Management was originally AS/NZS 4444 but has been replaced by ISO 17799 which incorporates the 
international standard developed from BS 7799.  
2 ISO 17799 is considered complementary to AS/NZS 444.2:2000 Information Security Management, Part 2 Specifications for information 
security management systems (AS/NZS 7799.2:2000 revised). 
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knowledge that exists with employees and that this knowledge be converted to explicit 
knowledge. It is only from the existence of explicit knowledge that an organisation as a whole 
can benefit from the knowledge’s ability to support improved decision making and problem 
solving.  The approach taken by Smith (2001) was to consider the role of tacit and explicit 
knowledge within an organisational decision making and problems solving context.  This can be 
applied to Computer Security as well. 
Kee (2002), while claiming that a critical component in the development of computer security 
polices in an organisation depends upon external standards, also suggests that security weakness 
in organisations often occurs as a result of the inability to transform external standards into a 
viable organisational framework.  The development of such a framework is dependent upon 
organisational knowledge and Kee (2002) suggests that there is a lack of conversion of existing 
organisational knowledge into security policies.  Within this context Kee (2002) argues that 
computer security management framework in an organisation should facilitate the development, 
monitoring and control of the security policies in order for the organisation to achieve 
availability, integrity and confidentiality of information.   Recognition of the roles of both tacit 
and explicit knowledge is essential to create organisational knowledge and improve their ability 
to utilise knowledge in support of decision-making.   The conversion of tacit knowledge related 
to computer security procedures into explicit knowledge in organisations can provide better 
controls to combat security related problems.   
The survey of computer security focused literature has provided a holistic view of how computer 
security functions within an organisation.  From the review of prior research significant 
organisational computer security characteristics have been able to be identified.  From prior 
studies, it can be argued that although organisations can be guided by external standards and 
expertise in the management of their computer security, these  policies and procedures must be 
aligned with organisations infrastructure and knowledge (Goh, 2002; Higgins, 1999; Kee, 2002; 
Kwok & Longley, 1999; Schultze & Leidner, 2002).  Significant processes within computer 
security rely on the ability of organisations to transfer knowledge in order to support effective 
decisions.  Further, that this knowledge transfer process must be continuous and not only include 
traditional organisational knowledge but explicit expert knowledge. This knowledge management 
process in support of computer security can occur in the context of organisational management 
models (Kee, 2002; Kwok & Longley, 1999; Von Solms, 1999).   
Despite the fact that external computer security standards and expertise provide a guide for 
organisations to manage their computer security, it appears they fail to provide a mechanism that 
links the security process to the organisational knowledge. The result is that often security 
policies, procedures and controls are implemented that are not strong and consistent. From a 
review of prior studies it appears that the application of knowledge management to computer 
security may provide considerable benefits to organisations in developing and managing their 
security.  Therefore, this study raises the following question: 
What is the extent of the role of organisational knowledge in computer security? 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The objective of this study is to develop a greater understanding of characteristics of the 
relationship of organisational knowledge and computer security in organisations.  Although prior 
studies indicate that the application of organisational knowledge to computer security has  
potential benefits, it appears that management of this knowledge appears to be limited in 
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organisations  (Goh, 2002; Gore & Gore, 1999; Griseri, 2002; Holsapple & Joshi, 2000; Kee, 
2002; Kwok & Longley, 1999; Schultze & Leidner, 2002). Although prior studies have 
considered the management perspective of computer security they have done so solely from a 
technical perspective and failed to recognise the broader organisational issues (Brooks, 2002; 
Kwok & Longley, 1999; Von Solms, 1999).  In contrast, it appears that,  prior research in 
knowledge management has traditionally focused on the management of knowledge within the 
organisational framework rather than towards organisational processes (Kreiner, 2002; Bhatt, 
2002; Laszlo & Laszlo, 2002; Schultze & Leidner, 2002). Accordingly it appears that many 
managers have not valued organisational knowledge in organisational computer security as they 
have failed to recognise a clear integration between these two entities.  Therefore, in can be 
inferred that there is lack of sufficient empirical studies to support a positivist3 approach in 
examining the factors influencing the role of knowledge management in computer security.  
From the review of prior studies it can be argued that organisations can be guided by external 
standards and benefit from computer security external expertise. However computer security 
procedures, the organisations infrastructure and organisational knowledge should be 
synchronised in order for the computer security to be  effective  (Goh, 2002; Higgins, 1999; Kee, 
2002; Kwok & Longley, 1999; Schultze & Leidner, 2002).  There is sufficient evidence to infer 
that computer security related processes rely on an organisation’s ability to transfer local 
knowledge available in organisation among employees.  Further this knowledge transfer process 
must be continuous and not only include traditional organisational knowledge but also explicit 
expert knowledge. Accordingly the research question raised in this study is warranted (Kee, 
2002; Kwok & Longley, 1999; Von Solms, 1999).  Prior studies indicate that the role of 
knowledge management in computer security is not yet well understood. Therefore the following 
hypothesis was developed to test the extent of the role of organisational knowledge in computer 
security: 
H1:  Organisation knowledge has a limited role in computer security.  
This study has focused on the extent of the role of organisational knowledge in computer security 
and collected data through a quantitative approach.  
INSTRUMENT DESIGN 
The study of knowledge management and computer security as a combined discipline is a 
relatively new area and there are limited prior models or research frameworks available on which 
to base the design of this study. Therefore a new data model is required to develop the conceptual 
framework.  The approach adopted to develop the new model was a construct matrix based on the 
prior study of Rivard et al. (1997). Rivard et al. (1997) developed a construct matrix based on key 
elements identified from prior studies.  This process involved the integration of research criteria 
(questions) within dimensions of the study that were considered as appropriate constructs. In this 
study, a computer security construct matrix was developed based on the model of Rivard et al 
(1997).   Similarly, a knowledge management construct matrix was developed to encompass key 
characteristics of knowledge management identified from prior literature. A total of seven 
                                                 
3 Ashram (2002) states that a positivist approach is where a researcher accepts the orthodox scientific view and proceeds to analyse the issue from 
that standpoint. The positivist approach assumes that there is an objective truth existing "out there", which can be uncovered through the scientific 
method which measures relationships between variables using logic and statistics. 
 
5 
constructs were designed.  They are external computer security standards, computer security 
policy and procedures, computer security performance, organisational use of internal knowledge 
in computer security, organisational use of tacit knowledge in computer security, organisational 
use of explicit knowledge in computer security and organisational performance in the 
management of computer security through the application of knowledge management.  These 
seven constructs consist of a total of 30 questions.  The seven constructs are developed as 
follows: 
• Construct 1 - External computer security standards (AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799, 2001; 
AusCERT, 2003; Von Solms, 1999) 
o Organisational use of external IT security-related standards (Q1);  The 
organisational development of computer security policies from external standards 
and guides (Q4);  Organisational use of external computer security expertise for 
development (Q5);  Organisational reliance on external standards to develop and 
manage computer security (Q20);  Organisational reliance extensively on 
computer security expertise to develop and manage computer security (Q21). 
• Construct 2 - Computer security polices and procedures  (Kee, 2002; Kwok & Longley, 
1999; Shim et al. 2000; Von Solms, 1999) 
o Organisational use of computer security policies and procedures (Q2);  
Organisational documentation of computer security policies and procedures (Q3);   
Construct 3 - Computer security performance (Kee, 2002; Kwok & Longley, 
1999; Von Solms, 1999);  Organisational computer security overall satisfaction 
(Q15);  Organisational computer security policy development satisfaction ((Q16);  
Organisational computer security procedure and management satisfaction (Q17);  
Organisational computer security mechanisms development and management 
satisfaction (Q18);  Organisational computer security measures development and 
management (Q19); and  Organisational computer security is cost effective (Q14). 
Knowledge Management Construct Matrix 
The Knowledge Management Construct Matrix (KMCM) was developed from prior studies such 
as Arora (2002), Bhatt (2002), Goh (2002), Kreiner (2002), and Laszlo and Laszlo (2002). As 
there was no prior study in knowledge management with a direct reference or relationship to 
computer security the dimensions of the matrix were developed reliant on a theoretical 
framework and validation from the pilot study.  The KMCM was designed based on four 
constructs of knowledge management and in turn included fourteen criteria (seventeen 
questions), namely: 
• Construct 4 - Organisational use of internal knowledge in computer security (Arora, 
2002; Bhatt, 2002; Goh, 2002; Liebowitz & Wilcox, 1997; Von Solms, 1999) 
o Use of organisational knowledge in developing and managing computer security 
polices (Q7);  Use of organisational knowledge in developing and managing 
computer security procedures (Q8);  Use of organisational knowledge in 
developing and managing computer security mechanisms (Q9);  Use of 
organisational knowledge in developing and managing computer security 
measures (Q10). 
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• Construct 5 - Organisational use of tacit knowledge in computer security (Bhatt, 2002; 
Kreiner, 2002; Smith, 2001; Von Solms, 1999) 
o Organisational reliance on internal computer security expertise (Q6 & Q22);  
Construct 6 - Organisational use of  explicit knowledge in computer security 
(Allen, 2001; Goh, 2002; Griseri, 2002);  Organisational use of knowledge 
management systems to facilitate their computer security (Q11);  Organisational 
use of explicit knowledge to develop and manage computer security (Q23);  
Organisational use of explicit knowledge to develop and manage computer 
security policies (Q24);  Organisational use of explicit knowledge to develop and 
manage computer security procedures (Q25);  Organisational use of explicit 
knowledge to develop and manage computer security mechanisms (Q26);  
Organisational use of explicit knowledge to develop and manage computer 
security measures (Q27). 
• Construct 7 - Organisational performance in the management of computer security 
through the application of knowledge management (Bhatt, 2002; Griseri, 2002; Von 
Solms, 1999) 
o Organisations will improve their management of computer security through 
linkage of organisational knowledge and computer security (Q12 & Q28);  
Knowledge management systems will improve an organisations management of 
their computer security (Q13 & Q 29); and  Knowledge management systems 
when applied to computer security will reduce costs for organisations (Q30).    
The conceptual schema of this study was developed principally from the literature review. As 
limited prior study has occurred in the combined disciplines of knowledge management and 
computer security it is recognised that this study will be, to a degree, abstract in nature and 
therefore the conceptual framework of the study should be clearly articulated. 
 
 
Conceptual Study Framework – Constructs 
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INSTRUMENT PREPARATION 
The opinion survey has been developed to be subjective based on quantitative values.  The survey 
has been designed to utilise a multiple scale technique, consisting of yes/no, frequency and Likert 
type scales. The frequency questions were based on a numerical scale structure that provides the 
respondents with the ability to select a value with a grouping criteria. The Likert Scale based 
questions were designed to support the respondent’s to provide an opinion based response by 
selecting from a structured scale which includes: strongly disagree (SA), disagree (D), neither 
agree nor disagree (N), agree (A), strongly agree (SA) and not applicable (NA). The “not 
applicable” component of the Likert scale was included because it has been recognised that not 
all criteria within the survey instrument would apply to all organisations. To facilitate the data 
analysis a weighting was placed on all questions. Questions relating to the respondents 
organisation profile (QP1 to QP7) were allocated a sliding scale from 1 and higher relating to the 
number of responses assigned to the criteria. Questions eight to fourteen (Q8 to Q14) which 
yes/no styled questions were allocated values of one (1) for yes and two (2) for no. The 
remaining questions from fifteen to thirty (Q15 to Q30) utilised a Likert scales ranging in value 
from one to five respectively. All questions which were considered not applicable by the 
respondent were assigned a value of zero (0). 
In excess of 100 survey instruments were distributed to select respondents of which 19 
participated. The survey was conducted by both electronic and manual distribution and the 
responses from the organisations were performed anonymously. The approach taken for the 
administration of the study was duplicated from the pilot study. The distribution of the survey 
instrument was supported with the assistance of computer security focused associations and 
networks so as to assist developing not only sufficient response but such organisations and 
representatives that fall within the sampling technique criteria.   The facilitating organisations 
were the Western Australian Information Security Special Interest Group (WAISSIG) and the 
IEEE Computer Society, WA Chapter. 
Prior to administering, the survey questions were validated for appropriateness, relevance and 
reliability. The approach that has been taken for the validation of the survey instrument was to 
utilise both a peer review and pilot study techniques. The data samples have been collected 
through utilising a stratified random purposeful sampling technique (SRPST). During the survey 
instrument development and respondent sample selection, the possibility of error was considered 
and mitigated.  The SRPST was selected as the most appropriate method for respondent sampling 
as it was recognised to be suitable because respondent organisations considered in this study must 
have an acceptable level of existing computer security and their representative completing the 
instrument must also  have an understanding of broader issues relating to the management of that 
security.  
The survey instrument was based on thirty questions (items) designed from a combination of 
prior studies. The approach to determine reliability was to apply Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha 
test. This was applied to the questions of the overall instrument, constructs collectively and by 
constructs individually. The instrument for the thirty items returned an alpha of 0.7372. Saunders 
(2003) and Zikmund (1994) state that this level although not high is an acceptable level for 
verifying repeatability for the instrument. Dooley (2001) argues that Cronbach’s alpha will 
generally only return strong result for those items (questions) which are based on a scale response 
such as Likert type scales.  Accordingly questions fifteen to thirty of the instrument were 
evaluated and returned an alpha of 0.8170. Saunders (2003) and Zikmund (1994) state that this 
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level demonstrates acceptable reliability. Therefore from the perspective of the reliability of the 
instrument items (questions) and construct design it can be argued that they are suitable for this 
study. 
An issue recognised in the testing of the constructs is that they were developed from a limited set 
of prior literature and accordingly the data may be multidimensional. The internal consistency of 
each of the constructs individually was considered and an evaluation of the constructs returned 
values over 0.7740 to most constructs.  The application of Cronbach’s alpha to the individual 
constructs has demonstrated the reliability of constructs two, three, four, six and seven. Dooley 
(2001) argues that this reliability evaluation approach can often result in skewed results when the 
size of the data pool is limited. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, the results obtained 
were considered acceptable. Therefore it is assumed that the instrument used is free from error 
and is expected to yield consistent results4.  The content validity was achieved through peer 
review. The peer review involved the solicitation of the evaluation of the survey instrument by 
colleagues to verify it for relevance, appropriateness, applicability and the use of scales of 
questions.   The peer review was conducted to further refine the survey instrument prior to the 
second validation step, the pilot study. The peer review process involved the circulation of a draft 
survey instrument and covering peer review request to colleagues for instrument evaluation.  A 
total of six peer review requests were completed and comments used to refine the instrument 
further.   The survey instrument was considered to have strong content validity as the 
development of the survey was based on instruments already in existence such as the Australian 
Computer Crime and Security Survey and the Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management. The instrument question validity was strong with an alpha of 0.73725 and hence for 
the purposes of this study the content validity was considered appropriate.  
DATA ANALYSIS  
The data were collected from people involved with policy development or management of 
computer security.  The term organisational knowledge was explained to them to be details that 
can be found within the organisation and expert knowledge is any assistance from outside 
experts.  The term knowledge management was explained to be the ‘handling’ of information for 
various management purposes associated with computer security issues.   
The descriptive analysis of the constructs was performed based on frequency distribution which 
considered the standard deviation, error of skewness and error of Kurtosis.  Many studies choose 
to ignore such responses, usually called ‘outliers’, during the analysis of data because they may 
distort the analysis (Zikmund, 1994).  For the purposes of this study the Empirical Rule was 
applied to ensure that the collected data was suitably allocated within the bell-shaped curve6. The 
data distribution for constructs one to seven had an acceptable level with the mean and hence for 
the purposes of this study constitutes a reliable distribution.  
An analysis of the correlation of constructs was conducted in order to consider the role of 
organisational knowledge in organisational computer security. Although significant correlations 
occurred with Constructs 1 and 5 with other constructs they have been withdrawn from the study 
due to an inability to demonstrate reliability. Construct 2 which measured the use of computer 
security policies and procedures by organisations had a significant negative correlation with 
                                                 
4 Constructs 1 and 5 did not yield high levels of reliability and therefore will be reviewed or removed from the formal study – Refer Appendix E 
for Pilot Study Construct Data Structure   
5 Note that questions 15 to 30 returned an alpha of 0.8170 – Refer Appendix D – Pilot Study Questions Reliability  
6 Traditionally referred to as the Normal Distribution Curve and refer Table 3.0 Main Study Construct Descriptive Statistics  
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construct 6 (-0.536)  which measured the use of explicit knowledge by organisations in managing 
their computer security.  Construct 3 which measured computer security performance related to 
development, management and cost, demonstrated a  significant positive correlation with 
construct 6 (0.735) which measured organisational use of explicit knowledge in the development 
and management of their computer security. Construct 4 which measured the use of internal 
knowledge by organisations in the development and management of their computer security 
showed no major correlation. Construct 6, apart from the identified correlations with constructs 2 
and 3, showed no other major correlations. 
The correlations of constructs 1 and 5 were not significant and hence they were not considered in 
detail in this study.  Construct 1 that measured the use of computer security external standards 
and expertise by organisations in the development and management of their computer security, 
had a significant positive correlation  (0.550) with construct 2, which measured the use of 
policies and procedures by organisations in managing their computer security. Further construct 
5, which measured organisational use of tacit knowledge, had a significant positive correlation 
(0.486) with construct 7, which measured an organisation’s performance in the development and 
management of their computer security.  The implications of these findings are that it would 
appear that for those organisations who utilise external standards and expertise have a stronger 
application of computer security polices and procedures. Further, those organisations that have a 
stronger reliance on tacit knowledge tend to have a stronger organisational performance in the 
management of their computer security.  
An analysis of the correlation of construct 2 and construct 6 (Refer Figure 1) clearly demonstrates 
a significant negative correlation. The data indicate that for those organisations that have a 
greater reliance on computer security policies and procedures do not utilise explicit (or 
documented) organisational knowledge to manage their computer security.   
An analysis of the correlation of construct 3 and construct 6 (Refer Figure 2) clearly demonstrates 
a significant positive correlation. The data indicate that those organisations that have a greater 
reliance on explicit or documented knowledge have a stronger performance of their computer 
security.   
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Figure 1 Correlation of Organisational Use of Polices and Procedures & Organisational Use of Explicit 
Knowledge in the Development and Management of Computer Security 
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Figure 2 Correlation of Those Organisations Who Utilise Explicit Knowledge in the Development and 
management of Their Computer Security & Satisfaction with Performance of Computer Security 
 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the correlations of the constructs and supporting items (questions) has identified 
several significant factors and trends.  The study found that those organisations using external 
expertise have a strong positive relationship with those organisations that utilise computer 
security policies and procedures. This is consistent with prior studies of  Higgins (1999), Kee 
(2002) and Von Solms (1999) who argue that computer security standards are necessary to 
provide organisations with a structured framework of computer security polices and procedures. 
From the Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey it is argued that 43% of Australian 
organisations utilise external computer security standards. This is also consistent with the 
respondent demographics of this study which demonstrated that 50% of respondents utilised 
external computer security standards.  A significant factor emerged in the study was that the 
organisations that utilised computer security polices and procedures had a significant negative 
relationship with those organisations that utilised explicit organisational knowledge.  In other 
words, people in organisations felt that external expertise is necessarily productive in establishing 
security procedures.  Therefore it could be asserted that those organisations which have a reliance 
on computer security policies and procedures which are derived from external computer security 
standards do not utilise organisational knowledge found in various documentations within the 
organisation in the computer security development and management process. This appears to 
indicate that external consultants, perhaps, ‘sell’ their solutions to organisations without actually 
studying the organisation.  Further as no major correlation was realised between those 
organisations who utilised computer security polices and procedures with the use of 
organisational knowledge, it can be argued that no significant evidence exists to show that 
organisations utilise their local knowledge in the development and management of their computer 
security.  This finding is new and needs detailed examination. 
The study has demonstrated strong evidence to support that those organisations that utilise 
explicit organisational knowledge in the management and development of their computer security 
believed that they have a more satisfactory level of computer security performance.  It should be 
noted that performance was not empirically measured in this study.  Further, those organisations 
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that utilise tacit organisational knowledge believed that their overall organisational performance 
in the development and management of their computer security is superior.  This indicates that 
organisational knowledge plays a key role in computer security.  In particular the evidence from 
these organisations supports that a direct linkage between organisational knowledge and their 
computer security through a knowledge management system would improve efficiency and 
reduces costs.  Therefore it can be concluded that the application of knowledge management to 
an organisation’s development and management of computer security can have a positive 
relationship and directly improve efficiency and reduce costs.  For the purposes of this study the 
issue is, then, to what extent is knowledge management currently utilised by organisations. 
From this study there was only indicative evidence that 20% of respondent organisations 
currently utilised knowledge management in the development and management of their computer 
security. It can therefore be asserted that, despite the positive influence of the application of 
knowledge management to the development and management of computer security, there was no 
significant evidence to support the major use of tacit or explicit knowledge by organisations in 
the development and management of their computer security. Therefore, the hypothesis for this 
study is considered accepted.  Accordingly it can be affirmed that organisational knowledge has a 
limited role in organisational computer security.  
STUDY IMPLICATIONS 
The theoretical implications are that prior studies have more focus towards the technical aspects 
of computer security standards, policies and procedures and have failed to recognise the 
importance of both tacit and explicit knowledge within organisations. From a practical 
implication organisations would appear to have an opportunity to reduce their computer security 
costs and improve performance through an integration of computer security practices and 
organisational knowledge. 
LIMITATIONS 
This study is a preliminary study into the role of organisational knowledge in computer security 
and has been limited as only a few prior studies have been conducted within this discipline and 
therefore only limited prior information was available for the purposes of developing this study.   
Although the study has in fact yielded strong results they are themselves limited by the minimal 
number of respondents. However the study is still considered acceptable both in design and 
outcomes as this is a preliminary study and has effectively achieved its objectives. Consideration 
should be given towards future research so that lessons learnt from this study can contribute to 
stronger data collection and applicability. 
FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study has identified a number of dimensions of the role of organisational knowledge in 
computer security that warrants further research. In particular it would appear that existing 
organisational practices which support the use of external computer security standards, associated 
policies and procedures are restrictive in nature to effectively engage the use of organisational 
knowledge. Given that this preliminary study has demonstrated that there is a strong argument for 
the application of knowledge management in order to improve an organisations development and 
management of their computer security, future research should focus on how existing standards 
and practices can be improved to allow for a stronger integration of computer security procedures 
with organisational knowledge through the application of knowledge management systems. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although prior studies indicate that the application of knowledge management to computer 
security has  potential benefits, there was limited prior study that directly dealt with this problem 
(Goh, 2002; Gore & Gore, 1999; Griseri, 2002; Holsapple & Joshi, 2000; Kee, 2002; Kwok & 
Longley, 1999; Schultze & Leidner, 2002). Although these prior studies supported external 
computer security standards and guides as foundations for effective organisational computer 
security, they only made recommendations as to how an organisation should develop and 
implement the security and failed to provide a mechanism that links the security process to the 
organisational knowledge. The result is that often security policies, procedures and controls are 
implemented that are neither strong nor consistent with the organisation’s objectives. This study 
examined the role of organisational knowledge in computer security and concluded that currently 
organisational knowledge has a limited role in computer security.  Although the role of 
organisational knowledge in computer security is currently limited, it appears that the application 
of knowledge management systems to organisational computer security development and 
management processes would enhance the performance and reduce costs of such practices. 
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